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NOTES
STATE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL
REGULATION BASED ON THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE-NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY
A new constitutional immunity from federal regulatory authority was
established by the United States Supreme Court's decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery.' Basing its holding on the state sovereignty
implicit in the Tenth Amendment 2 and the federal system, the Supreme
Court invalidated federal wage and hour regulations as applied to em-
ployees of state and local governments. Now, the otherwise plenary
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause3 may not be exercised
in a manner that displaces "the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."4
Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court upheld federal wage and
hour provisions as originally enacted in the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) of 1938.2 Subsequent amendments in 19611 and 19667 to extend
coverage to additional numbers and types of employees also were up-
1. 96 S.Ct. 2465 (1976) [hereinafter cited as National League].
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." The terms "delegated" and "reserved" are used in this casenote in this
constitutional sense.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 2: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
4. 96 S.Ct. at 2474.
5. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. §202 et seq. (1940).
The Act prescribed minimum wages, maximum hours, and other basic conditions of
employment (such as child labor) for private-sector workers engaged in interstate com-
merce or the production of goods for interstate commerce. As originally enacted, the FLSA
specifically exempted the employees of state and local governments. 52 Stat. 1060 §(3)(d),
29 U.S.C. §203(d) (1940).
6. 75 Stat. 65, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s), 206(b), 207(a)(2) (1964). The 1961 amend-
ments expanded coverage to include not only employees engaged in commerce, but also
all employees of an "enterprise" having any employees so engaged.
7. 80 Stat. 831, 29 U.S.C. §§203(d), 203(r), 203(s), 206(d) (1970). The original exemp-
tion of state employees from coverage was removed, and state hospitals and schools were
specifically defined as "enterprises" subject to the Act. The combined effect of the 1961
and 1966 amendments was to include virtually all nonprofessional employees of specified
state institutions under FLSA coverage, whether or not their activities individually af-
fected interstate commerce.
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held. Of particular significance was the Court's decision in Maryland
v. Wirtz' in 1968 that coverage of the employees of state hospitals and
schools did not violate any constitutional prohibition based on state
sovereignty.
In 1974, Congress further amended the Act to extend coverage to
virtually all non-supervisory and non-elected personnel of state and
local governments."' These amendments were challenged in National
League of Cities v. Usery by the National League of Cities and a number
of state and local governments." Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secre-
tary of Labor from enforcing the amendments." Without making a fact
8. The original act was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, amended, 312 U.S. 657 (1941). Both the 1961 and the 1966 amendments received
the Court's sanction in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Other unsuccessful chal-
lenges by states to the FLSA amendments included Dunlop v. New Jersey, 522 F.2d 504
(3d Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Indiana, 517 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Iowa, 494
F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, Iowa v. Dunlop, 95 S.Ct. 2422 (1975). But see dissent
in Brennan v. Indiana, 517 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975) (vast paternalist federal bureaucracy
is destroying last vestiges of state sovereignty).
9. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Maryland v. Wirtz dealt with an issue almost identical to the
issue in National League: whether the extension of Fair Labor Standards Act coverage to
state governmental employees violated protected areas of state sovereignty. In Wirtz, only
state school and hospital employees were involved, while in National League, almost all
state employees were covered. The majority in Wirtz ruled that state governments are
subject to federal regulatory authority to the same extent as are private individuals. A
dissent by Justices Douglas and Stewart objected to the heavy fiscal burdens imposed
upon state governments by the FLSA amendments, and expressed the apprehension that
the rationale of the majority would permit Congress to "devour the essentials of state
sovereignty." Id. at 205.
10. 88 Stat. 55, 29 U.S.C. §§203(d), 203(x) (Supp. V, 1975) ("employer" covered by the
Act includes public agencies such as states and their political subdivisions). Exemptions
were provided for executive and professional personnel, 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(1), and for
elected officials and certain of their advisors. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).
11. Twenty states and four local governments joined the National League of Cities and
the National Governors' Conference as plaintiffs in the action. 96 S.Ct. at 2466 n.7.
12. Plaintiffs alleged grave damage to their fiscal integrity, sovereignty, and continued
existence as independent governments. Representative of the claims made were the allega-
tions that the 1974 amendments would dictate 85% of total state and local government
budgets, transfer control of the governments to federal bureaucrats, usurp essential func-
tions in personnel matters for nearly 11 million employees, prohibit volunteer firefighters,
and result in "homogenous State and City Governments, indistinguishable except as to
name and geography, with uniform governmental services." Appellant's Jurisdictional
Statement at 5, 6, 15, 17, 32, National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465 (1976).
Costs of compliance would be over one billion dollars. Suppl. Brief for Appellant on
Reargument at 5-6, National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465 (1976).
Appellee, in contrast, contended that the FLSA amendments imposed no policy goals
on governments, merely proscribed substandard working conditions and wages, and had
no effect on volunteers. Brief for Appellee at 22, 38, 49. The wages of only 95,000 employees
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determination, the three-judge District Court dismissed the action.13
That same day, Chief Justice Burger, acting in his capacity as Circuit
Justice, granted relief pendente lite and referred the case to the full
Supreme Court."
In a five-Justice majority opinion," the Supreme Court expressly
overruled Maryland v. Wirtz" and departed from a substantial body of
precedent on the federal commerce power in relation to state preroga-
tives. 7 The following discussion of the issues raised will include an ex-
(or 3.61" of total municipal and state employees) would be affected, constituting only 2%
of governmental wage costs. Costs of compliance would be less than half a million dollars.
Motion of Appellee to Affirm at 20-22, National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465
(1976).
The Court essentially accepted the plaintiffs' contentions and found the major impact
of the amendments to be the loss of flexibility in structuring employee working schedules
to meet local administrative needs without incurring prohibitive liabilities for overtime
pay.
13. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974). The decision
was rendered only one day after hearing arguments, the district court feeling bound by
the precedent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The decision noted that the
depositions and affidavits of the litigants would be made part of the record, and stated
that "the foregoing will constitute our finding of fact." National League of Cities v.
Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D.D.C. 1974).
14. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 95 S.Ct. 532 (Burger, Circuit Justice, 1974).
The rapid action was due to the fact that Department of Labor regulations based on the
1974 amendments were scheduled to take effect less than five hours after Burger's action.
The result was that the Supreme Court was presented with an issue of substantial consti-
tutional import with only cursory examination at lower levels and no resolution of the
vastly disparate factual claims of the litigants.
15. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist. Blackmun, who had joined in the majority, wrote a short concur-
ring opinion dissociating himself from some of the implications of the decision. A sharp
dissent by Brennan, White, and Marshall described the decision as, inter alia, "absurd,"
"roughshod," "devoid of meaningful content," 96 S.Ct. at 2478-84, "thinly veiled rational-
ization," "unworkable," and "catastrophic," 96 S.Ct. at 2486-88. The three Justices
argued that the federal government is supreme and unrestricted in the exercise of its
constitutional powers, and that safeguards from abuse arise not by prohibitions based on
state sovereignty but rather by the political process within Congress. In addition, Stevens
tiled a separate dissent, stating that no constitutional principle invalidated the FLSA
amendments that would not also invalidate other federal laws that he considered unques-
tionably valid.
16. 96 S.Ct. at 2468, 2475.
17. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (states are not immune from
regulation under the Commerce Clause merely because of their sovereign status); Califor-
nia v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (federal labor relations policy supersedes state civil
service laws); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936) (state sovereignty
imposes no limitation on the exercise of the commerce power); Sanitary Dist. v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925) (when state power conflicts with federal commerce
power, the United States will prevail).
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amination of the status of state sovereignty in the traditional Commerce
Clause analysis, the basis for implying a new immunity for the states
in intergovernmental disputes, and the scope of the new immunity.
Since the conclusion of this Note is that the scope of the new immunity
is not well-defined, a method for alleviating this problem is suggested.
STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE TRADITIONAL COMMERCE CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of federal power to regu-
late interstate commerce, since the early 1930's, limited judicial inquiry
to two factors: whether the challenged legislation effectuates a legiti-
mate objective affecting interstate commerce, and whether the means
chosen by Congress bear a rational relationship to that objective., The
increase in federal regulation of the economy and the concurrent in-
crease in state governmental activity in the economic sphere resulted in
repeated litigation of issues concerning federal authority to regulate
state activities."'
Although the rational relationship standard was developed princi-
pally in decisions concerning federal regulation of the private sector,"'
the Supreme Court also applied that standard to the federal regulation
of state and local governments." If the rational relationship standard
had been adhered to, the Court's finding in National League that the
18. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(the only questions are whether the activities affect commerce and whether the means
chosen by Congress are reasonable); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (if
Congress has a rational basis for regulating commerce, judicial investigation is at an end);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. ll (1942) (commerce power extends to even intrastate
activities if the regulation is an appropriate means for the effective execution of the power
over interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1940) (commerce
power includes all "appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end"); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (power to regulate commerce includes
power to enact "all appropriate legislation").
19. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (regulation of wages of state
employees in hospitals and schools); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (regulation of sale
price of state-owned timber); California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1943) (regulation
of wharfage procedure and fees of state port authority); United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175 (1936) (regulation of state-operated railroad); Sanitary Dist. v. United States,
266 U.S. 405 (1925) (regulation of municipal sewage disposal); City of Dallas v. Bowles,
152 F.2d 464 (Emer. Ct. App. 1945) (regulation of rent of municipally-owned housing);
United States v. Ohio, 354 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1965) (agricultural acreage quotas applied
to state prison land).
20. Each of the cases cited in note 18, supra, concerned regulation of private individuals
or businesses.
21. Each of the cases cited in note 19, supra, held that the challenged federal legislation
was valid since it concerned interstate commerce and was rationally related to a legitimate
objective. The fact that the entities subjected to regulation were state and local govern-
ments did not affect the result.
19761 NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY
Fair Labor Standards Act amendments were rationally related to a le-
gitimate Commerce Clause objective22 would have been dispositive of
the case.
Prior to National League, Supreme Court decisions uniformly indi-
cated that the existence of countervailing state policies or interests was
of no consequence in adjudicating challenges to the exercise of the com-
merce power,2 since the national government is paramount within the
sphere of its constitutional powers.2 In this perspective, the Tenth
Amendment was not a limitation on the authority of Congress to act
within its appropriate powers, but merely an obvious "truism" that the
powers not granted to the national government are reserved to the
states."2 The Tenth Amendment could be invoked properly only after the
judiciary determined that Congress had transgressed the states' re-
served powers. States were considered to be "subordinate" to federal
22. 96 S.Ct. at 2473. The accusation in the dissent, 96 S.Ct. at 2482, that the majority
reverted to the discredited philosophy of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) is therefore incorrect. The majority created an
implied immunity for states from regulation that admittedly affects interstate commerce,
while Hammer and Butler temporarily established an immunity for individuals on the
basis that their activities were not in interstate commerce.
23. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (it
is not for the Court to determine if detriment to the state outweighs the value of the federal
commerce enactment); Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S.
498 (1942) (when Congress determines that national interests outbalance state interests,
courts may not overturn that judgment); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405
(1925) (argument that federal regulation would cost city "a hundred million dollars" is
irrelevant since federal power is paramount). This analysis is clearly apparent in the two
precedents most apposite to the issues in National League: Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968) and Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). Wirtz indicated that "the only
question for the court is . . . whether the class is 'within the reach of the federal power."'
392 U.S. at 192. In Fry, the finding that wage increases for state employees "could have a
significant effect on commerce," 421 U.S. at 547, was dispositive. The objection based on
state sovereignty was dismissed in a single paragraph.
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
• . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
25. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). Accord, Sperry v. Florida ex rel.
Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (Tenth Amendment is not violated by exercise of a
delegated power, despite concurrent effects on matters otherwise within state control);
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (Tenth Amendment does not limit federal power to
accomplish a legitimate end); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) ("Tenth
Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the power, express or implied, dele-
gated to the national government."); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941) (Tenth Amendment does not limit the national government in
the exercise of a granted power); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733-34 (1931)
(Tenth Amendment adds nothing to meaning of Constitution).
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regulations and could no more deny the exercise of a granted power than
could an individual. 26
Based on this premise, the Supreme Court countenanced congres-
sional interference in a broad range of governmental operations, 2 specif-
ically including the employment relations of state and local govern-
ments with their own civil servants. 2' Even pervasive regulation of gov-
ernmental functions, resulting in enormous fiscal burdens, received the
Supreme Court's express sanction. 2'
Prior to National League, only two sources of protection were avail-
able to the states to preserve their autonomy from the encroachments
of the federal commerce power. One source was the inherent limitations
of the Commerce Clause phrase, "commerce with foreign Nations and
among the several States." The expansive modern interpretation of
26. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185, 197 (1936); cited with approval
in. e.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the
Ala. State Dock Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ohio, 354 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 385 U.S. 9 (1966)
(per curiam) (crops grown on prison farms); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (sales of
timber to raise revenue for public schools); California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944)
(public wharf facilities); Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (purchase
of imported scientific apparatus by a state university); Sanitary Dist. v. United States,
266 U.S. 405 (1925) (municipal sewage disposal); City of Dallas v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 464
(Emer. Ct. App. 1945) (state-owned housing).
28. The federal courts have consistently held that states as employers are subject to the
same controls as other employers. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Dock
Dep't, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (Railroad Safety Appliance Act); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542 (1975) (Economic Stabilization Act); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (Fair
Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Local 254, Bldg. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 376 F.2d
131 (1st Cir. 1967) (state department of education is an "employer" under National Labor
Relations Act); Florida v. Mathews, 526 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1976) (Medicaid legislation);
Colorado v. United States, 219 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1954) (Packers and Stockyards Act);
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (Railway Labor Act). Justice Douglas' comment
that the states "are not entirely immune from federal regulation," Maryland v. Wirtz,
suopra at 203, is therefore an enormous understatement.
29. See Employees v. Missouri Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1973) (Congress is
permitted to "place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States" or to impose
"pervasive" regulation). This decision created the anomaly that state agencies are subject
to coverage under the FLSA as fully as are employers in the private sector, but are not
subject to suits by their employees to enforce FLSA rights as are employers in the private
sector. The Court accepted state sovereign immunity from lawsuits by citizens, but re-
jected state sovereign immunity from regulation by the federal government.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 2. The extremely few Supreme Court decisions invalidat-
ing federal laws under the Commerce Clause all involved a restrictive interpretation of
interstate commerce, which has since been discredited. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936) (coal may not be regulated when it is mined but only when it later enters
interstate commerce); Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
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interstate commerce, however, permits federal regulation of virtually all
activities having even an indirect or insubstantial effect on commerce. :"
The second source of protection for state sovereignty was completely
outside of judicial purview. According to previous Supreme Court deci-
sions, : 2 the political process within Congress provided adequate safe-
guards for states' rights, making judicial involvement unnecessary. :
(slaughtering of chickens grown in other states is not in interstate commerce); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (child labor producing goods later sold in interstate
commerce is "purely local in its character").
31. Activities may be regulated under the interstate commerce power even though they
are not interstate and not in commerce; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB
v. -Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); even though moral and social issues
are involved and state policy choices thereby displaced; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964); even though the effect on commerce is indirect;
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); or trivial; Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, supra.
32. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (commerce power is absolute, re-
strained from abuse solely by "the wisdom and discretion of Congress" and the influence
which constituents possess at elections). See also Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities
in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies
about Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682, 695 (1976); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
(;overnment, 54 CoLuM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954).
33. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in National League, argued that the interests of state
governments are better protected by Congress than by the judiciary because the members
of Congress are "elected from the States." 96 S.Ct. at 2486, quoting J. Madison, The
Federalist No. 45, at 311-12 (,J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in Brennan's opinion). Mem-
bers of Congress are of course "elected from the States" in the sense that electoral districts
follow state boundaries, but they do not necessarily represent the interests of state govern-
ments, 96 S.Ct. at 2469 n.12 (majority opinion), and may well have national rather than
local perspectives. Brennan's use of a quotation from Madison to support national regula-
tion of state governmental activity is questionable, since Madison is generally portrayed
as an advocate of state autonomy, in conflict with Hamilton, who favored a more powerful
central government. See, e.g., Cowen, What is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C.
L. REV. 154, 157 (1961).
Since Madison's time, major changes have occurred in the balance of power between
state and national governments, and in the factors influencing national legislators. Of key
significance was the Sixteenth Amendment, creating the income tax, a vast new revenue
and power base of the central government. See Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, in
FEDERAI.ISM, MATURE AND EMERGENT 159, 160 (A. Macmahon ed. 1962); Blough, Fiscal
Aspects of Federalism, in FEDERALISM, MATURE AND EMERGENT 384, 385, 398 (A. Macmahon
ed. 1962). Among other major changes are the Seventeenth Amendment (Senators no
longer elected by state legislatures) and judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause
since the New Deal.
The dissent avers that federal intervention into state affairs results in effect from "deci-
sions of the States themselves." 96 S.Ct. at 2486. That FLSA coverage of state employees
was a decision made by states themselves must surely come as a surprise to the 36 state
governments (more than a 701 majority of the 50) that have resorted to lawsuits to
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This rationale effectively abdicated judicial responsibility and left the
preservation of the constitutional system of federalism dependent upon
the sufferance of the transient congressional majority. 1
The established analysis of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment, therefore, provided virtually no meaningful judicial pro-
tection for state sovereignty. States were accorded no greater considera-
tion than were individuals and were deemed adequately protected by
extra-judicial forces. The result has been a continual expansion of fed-
eral regulation into areas previously reserved to state governments.2
BASIS FOR IMPLYING AN IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL REGULATION
The Court, in National League, departed from the conventional anal-
ysis and instead relied on implied protections of the federal system
which appear throughout the Constitution.'" Support was found in two
analogies. The first analogy posited that the Tenth Amendment pr6tects
state prerogatives against intrusive federal regulations just as the First, 7
Fifth, :" and Sixth:" Amendments have been held to protect individual
challenge the FLSA amendments. (The total of 36 was derived by adding each of the states
involved in National League and previous FLSA cases, see note 8 supra, counting states
that participated in more than one suit only once).
:34. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946) (Douglas & Black, JJ.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas further stated that the "Constitution was designed to keep
the balance between the States and the nation outside the field of legislative controversy."
Id. Support for this position is also found in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725
(1868) ('The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed
of indestructible States"); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) ("neither
government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of
its power); C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29 (1970); Note, Is Federalism
Dead? A Constitutional Analysis of the Federal No-Fault Automobile Insurance Bill:
S. .354, 12 HARV. J. LE, s. 668, 681-82 (1975).
:15. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
36. References to the existence, powers, rights, and obligations of states are seen in the
Constitution of the United States in Articles I (legislative representation apportioned to
states, and some elements of state sovereignty surrendered to the Union), II (executive to
be selected by electors from the states), III (judiciary to have jurisdiction over interstate
controversies), IV (relations between states, admission of new states), V (amendment by
state action), VI (state judges and legislators bound by Constitution), and VII (ratification
by states). Further mention of states is made in 15 of the 25 amendments (numbers II,
VI, X to XII, XIV to XVII, XIX, and XXI to XXIV).
:37. U.S. CONST. amend. 1: "Congress shall make no law . ..abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
:38. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion."
39. U.S. CONST, amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. .... "
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liberties from federal usurpation."' Secondly, the well established im-
plied immunity of state governments from federal taxation was ex-
tended by analogy to include an immunity from federal regulation."
Justice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinion in National
League, has stated elsewhere that an affirmative argument that particu-
lar legislation intrudes impermissibly on constitutional rights has a far
greater likelihood of success than the negative contention that the legis-
lation exceeds the delegated powers of the national government. 2 Thus,
it is not surprising that he drew an analogy between individual liberties
and state prerogatives in order to protect the latter. The First, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments each create affirmative rights of individuals which
limit the otherwise plenary commerce power.4' The Tenth Amendment
may be similarly interpreted to create an affirmative constitutional
right of state governments to be free from federal intrusions into sover-
eign state functions, even when the national enactment concededly
40. 96 S.Ct. at 2469. The First and Sixth Amendments prevent Congress from exercis-
ing its commerce power in such a manner as to invade the rights to free speech, Mabee v.
White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (regulation of newspaper employees
permissible since the press was not singled out for special taxation or penalties) or trial
by jury, United States v. ,Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (Federal Kidnaping Act, based on
the Commerce Clause, impermissibly burdens the right to trial by jury). Fifth Amend-
ment protections from self-incrimination and deprivation of property without due process
similarly limit the regulatory authority of Congress. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968) (privilege from payment of tax on wagering, which is illegal in almost every state);
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (defense to prosecution for failure to pay tax
on wagering); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (defense to prosecution for
possession of an illegally unregistered weapon); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)
(privilege from registering as a person dealing in marijuana).
41. 96 S.Ct. at 2470 n.14. The limited tax immunity is recognized in, e.g., New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1935);
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 504 (1925).
42. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As an
illustration of this principle, note the varying treatment accorded two challenges to the
same piece of congressional legislation, the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §4741 et seq.
(1970). The Act required persons dealing in marijuana to register with the Internal Reve-
nue Service, and taxed all transfers of the substance to unregistered transferees at $100
per ounce or fraction of an ounce. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950), negative
assertions that the tax was a penalty and therefore not within the federal taxing power
were flatly and decisively rejected. In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), however,
the petitioner's affirmative privilege against self-incrimination was held to be a complete
defense.
43. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2469, 2477 (1976).
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bears a rational relationship to a legitimate congressional objective."
The analogy is imperfect in that the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ments each expressly limit the exercise of federal powers, while the
Tenth Amendment merely emphasizes the distinction between powers
granted to the national government by the Constitution and powers
reserved to the states. The Tenth Amendment contains no express limi-
tation on national regulatory authority. In National League, therefore,
the Supreme Court gave the Tenth Amendment a broader interpreta-
tion than its express terms require. The Court treated the amendment
as evidence of the necessary existence of states with sovereign preroga-
tives in the dual system of government that is recognized throughout the
Constitution.'" The Tenth Amendment would be wholly redundant if it
did not at a minimum prevent the federal Congress from "devouring the
essentials of state sovereignty" through the unlimited exercise of regula-
tory powers."'
The lack of an express constitutional protection for states has not
been an insuperable barrier in the field of intergovernmental immuni-
ties from taxation. The principle that taxation of one government by
another is antithetical to the federal structure was established in
M'Culloch v. Maryland,'7 in which the Supreme Court invalidated state
taxation of a national instrumentality. The principle was later extended
to protect states from the federal taxing power."
Early cases held states and their officers to be absolutely immune
from federal taxation,"' but a series of subsequent decisions restricted
44. Id. at 2470-71; Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 553 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
45. 96 S.Ct. at 2470-71; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (Congress may not infringe
on peculiarly state prerogatives, such as selecting the location of the state capitol); Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) ("in many Articles of the Constitution,
the necessary existence . .. and the independent authority of the States is distinctly
recognized"); Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 364-65 (1937) (explaining basis for
implied constitutional immunity from taxation).
46. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204-05 (1968) (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., dissent-
ing). Cf. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) ("The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States").
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
48. See. e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (I1 Wall.) 113 (1870).
49. United States v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 327-28 (1872):
The right of the states to administer their own affairs .. .is conceded by the
uniform decisions of this Court. . . .This carries with it an exemption . ..
from the taxing power of the Federal government. If they may be taxed lightly,
they ,may be taxed heavily; if justly, oppressively. Their operation may be
impeded and may be destroyed, if any interference is permitted.
This case was cited with approval by Justices Douglas and Black in their dissent in New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 592 (1946). For the early view of the state immunity
from federal taxation, see Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352 (1936) (municipal water
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the immunity to state functions that were deemed to be intrinsically
"governmental" or "essential." ' Enterprises that seemed to have "pro-
prietary" or quasi-private characteristics, such as state-operated rail-
roads' or liquor monopolies, "2 were not exempt from taxation.-' The
Supreme Court consistently recognized, however, that some limitations
on the federal taxing power were required to protect states from exces-
sive or unjustified interference with sovereignty.5 1
The analogy between the taxation and the commerce power had been
previously considered and rejected as "not illuminating" by the Su-
supply official exempt from federal income tax); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,
283 U.S. 570 (1931) (police department exempt from small federal excise tax on motorcy-
cle sales; "Where the principle applies it is not affected by the amount of the particular
tax or the extent of the resulting interference, but is absolute."); Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (federal government may not destroy or curtail activities of
state government through taxation of state officers; plaintiff, however, found not to qualify
as an officer); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). The last two cases were
overruled in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939).
50. The distinction was expressed using a variety of terms. Helvering v. Powers, 293
U.S. 214 (1934) (state personnel not in "usual governmental" functions are not exempt
from federal income tax); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (tax on state employ-
ees' salaries permissible since "essential governmental functions" were not affected); Hel-
vering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) (tax on income from leased
school lands not a "substantial interference" with the state); Board of Trustees v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (import tariff applies to states since it does not damage the dual
form of government).
51. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
52. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S.
360 (1934) (when a state engages in a business of a private nature, such as selling liquor,
that business is not withdrawn from the taxing power of the nation).
53. See also Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (public streetcar line); New York
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (state mineral-water bottling operation). The dis-
tinction between "proprietary" and "essential" functions was compromised and perhaps
abandoned in New York v. United States, supra, although the several divergent opinions
in the case make the holding doubtful. The plurality of only two Justices (Frankfurter and
Rutledge, who also wrote a concurring opinion) rejected the "essential functions" test,
limiting the immunity to taxes discriminating against a state. Four Justices, concurring,
did not discuss the "essential functions" issue, but indicated that even a nondiscrimi-
natory tax might unduly interfere with sovereign functions. Douglas and Black, dissent-
ing, rejected all taxes on activities of a sovereign state, whether or not "essential." Jackson
did not participate. In National League, both the majority and the dissent were able to
find support in the several opinions of New York v. United States.
54. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), limited the tax immunity more
severely than other decisions. See notes 49-52 supra. Even in New York, however, eight
Justices agreed that states are not wholly subordinate to the federal taxation power,
although they disagreed on the scope of the exemption.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:101
preme Court. '5 In United States v. California," the Court described the
tax immunity as "implied from the nature of our federal system," and
necessary to protect both the national and state governments in the
exercise of their powers." However, it is difficult to understand why this
description would not apply to regulatory legislation with equal or
greater force. The practical effect of taxation is frequently so closely
akin to regulation as to be virtually indistinguishable.5 1 State immunity
from federal regulation may well be even more vital to the preservation
of the federal system than immunity from taxation, since regulation
affects state policy choices as well as revenues."
It may have been the implicit recognition of these criticisms that led
to a softening of the Court's dicta in the two cases of the last decade
most apposite to the issues in National League. In Maryland v. Wirtz,"'
the Supreme Court upheld the FLSA as applied to state hospital and
school employees because of the effects of these institutions on com-
merce. The Court emphasized the limited nature of the interference
with state functions, however, and acknowledged that the Court had
power to prevent "the utter destruction of the state."', In Fry v. United
55. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1935). Accord, Case v. Bowles,
:327 U.S. 92 (1946); Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933). The dissent
in National League relied upon United States v. California as a "complete refutation" of
the majority decision. 96 S.Ct. at 2481.
56. 296 U.S. 175 (1935).
57. Id. at 184.
58. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (upholding a tax of $100 per
ounce of marijuana, the Court indicated that a tax is valid even though it "regulates,
discourages or definitely deters the activities taxed," and, somewhat cryptically, even
though the tax affects "activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate"); Fernan-
dez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (estate tax, like all others, has an inseparably
concomitant regulatory effect); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1936)
(firearms tax upheld; "every tax is in some measure regulatory"); Mangano Co. v. Hamil-
ton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1933) (prohibitive state tax on margarine valid even though effect is
to restrict or even destroy certain occupations); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27
(190;3) (federal tax which allegedly would destroy margarine industry upheld).
59. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 553-54 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For
the relation of the taxation and regulatory immunities, see also National League of Cities
v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2470 (1976) (asserted distinction between the two immunities
escapes majority of the Court); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204 (1967) (Douglas &
Stewart, JJ., dissenting) ("The exercise of the commerce power may also destroy state
sovereignty").
60. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
61. Id. at 196. The dissent in National League attempts to vitiate the significance of
the Wirtz statement, ascribing its meaning to the Supreme Court's power to invalidate
legislation that does not affect interstate commerce. 96 S.Ct. at 2478 n.3. In view of the
inclusive modern scope of the commerce power, see note 18 supra, such an interpretation
would reduce judicial "protection" of state sovereignty to an inconsequential formality.
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States, 2 the Court upheld the imposition of maximum wage controls on
state employees since the legislation bore a rational relationship to a
congressional objective within the scope of the commerce power. "
Nevertheless, the opinion has been recognized as an example of a "grow-
ing sensitivity to federalistic limits,"" and has been cited by lower
courts in support of the position that federal regulatory power is not
limitless.15 The majority noted that the Tenth Amendment is "not with-
out significance," declaring that congressional power may not be exer-
cised "in a fashion that impairs the States' ability to function effectively
in a federal system."6 " Although the wage freeze was "even less" of an
imposition on the states than that in Wirtz, the decision suggested that
a "drastic invasion" of sovereignty could not be tolerated."7
Wirtz and Fry indicate a substantial shift in the Supreme Court's
thinking, away from the traditional analysis of the Commerce Clause,"
62. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
63. Id. at 547. The Supreme Court found that wage increases to state employees might
jeopardize the congressional goal of stabilizing the economy.
64. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125-26 (9th ed. 1975).
See also The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 50 (Fry indicates that the
Court may enunciate restrictions "in future cases involving more comprehensive, long-
term intrusions into state operations"); Tribe, supra note 32, at 698-99 (a drastic invasion
of sovereignty could be invalidated even if clearly intended by Congress). Each of these
sources mentioned National League in footnotes, before the Supreme Court decision was
announced, as a significant possible future development. Tribe accurately predicted that
if the Court in National League struck down the FLSA amendments, it will have created
"a limited state enclave secure from federal power." Id. at 698 n.78.
65. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.D.C. 1975), cert. granted, 96
S.Ct. 2224 (1976). This decision also cited Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) for
the principle that the federal government is to avoid "drastic" invasions of state sover-
eignty. Id. at 993.
66. 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). In an unpersuasive endeavor to avoid the apparent
meaning of this statement, that even delegated powers have federalistic limits, the dissent
in National League argues that the statement means only that powers not delegated may
not be exercised. 96 S.Ct. at 2478-79 n.4.
67. 421 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1975).
68. The holdings of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) and Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542 (1975) must be distinguished from some of the language contained in their
majority and dissenting opinions. In both cases, dissents argued the necessity of preserving
state autonomy from unlimited federal regulation, and the majorities agreed to the princi-
ple. 392 U.S. at 196 (majority) and 205 (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., dissenting); 421 U.S. at
548 n.7 (majority) and 549-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In this sense, the two opinions
may be recognized as supporting the judicial attitude toward state prerogatives that
became most clearly apparent in National League. Nevertheless, the majorities upheld
the intrusions into state affairs in both Wirtz and Fry because the federal legislation at
issue bore a rational relationship to interstate commerce, and because the intrusions were
not found to be excessively burdensome to the states. The rationale underlying the
Supreme Court's decision in National League to overrule the holding in Wirtz, 96 S.Ct.
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and away from the virtually unrestricted supremacy of the federal regu-
latory power expressed in United States v. California."' While an other-
wise valid exercise of commerce power would not be defeated merely
because it affected state prerogatives, Wirtz and Fry recognized that
some measures might unconstitutionally exceed federalistic limits.
National League, in this context, represents merely the first application
by the Supreme Court of this developing philosophy of federalism to
invalidate a piece of congressional regulatory legislation."
SCOPE OF THE IMPLIED STATE IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL REGULATION
Now that the existence of an implied immunity is established, the
critical question is the nature, extent, and limitations of the immunity.
The holding of the case in this vital respect is unclear and internally
inconsistent, and provides inadequate guidance to the lower courts for
future decisions. The explicit characterization of the protection as
sweeping7' conflicts with other indications that a balancing test is being
employed or that an "essential functions" test is being borrowed from
the taxation cases. The language of the Court indicated that even
minimal interference with state activities would violate the constitu-
tional prohibitions enunciated in the opinion." The federal government,
Rehnquist asserted, may not "directly displace the states' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions" or interfere with "fundamental employment decisions" made by
the state in the performance of its functions." Stated in such encom-
at 2474, while expressly leaving unimpaired the holding in Fry, 96 S.Ct. at 2475, is there-
fore questionable. If Wirtz were to be overruled, then logically Fry should also have been
overruled.
69. 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1935): "In each case the power of the state is subordinate to the
constitutional exercise of the granted federal power." The Supreme Court in United States
v. California made clear its rejection of intergovernmental immunity protecting state
governments from the plenary federal power to regulate commerce. "The State can no
more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individ-
ual." Id. at 185.
70. Since the 1930's, the Supreme Court had not held a federal statute unconstitutional
on the basis that it exceeded federal power to regulate interstate commerce. Cowen, What
is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C. L. REV. 154, 171 (1961). The author predicted
that "the Tenth Amendment will never again be successfully used to nullify an act of
Congress based on the Commerce power." Id. at 173.
71. See note 73 infra.
72. See cases cited in notes 47-52 supra.
73. The Court referred at length to the plaintiffs' complaints of grievous disruption and
unsupportable burdens resulting from the FLSA amendments, but disclaimed reliance on
these disputed allegations as a basis for its decision. 96 S.Ct. at 2471, 2474.
74. 96 S.Ct. at 2474.
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passing terms, the new immunity might have far-reaching implica-
tions. 71 The national government could be excluded entirely from legis-
lating in the protected area of internal state governmental operations.
Congressional action to extend the coverage of employment-related leg-
islation to include state governmental personnel might be found uncon-
stitutional, since such legislation frequently interferes with governmen-
tal operations and employment decisions to some degree."'
However, it is unlikely that the Court meant to carve out such a broad
exception for the states from the federal commerce power. A methodol-
ogy of balancing state and federal interests is suggested by Rehnquist's
attempt to explain why it was not necessary to overrule Fry v. United
States,7 7 a case which seemingly was diametrically opposed to the result
in National League. Three factors were utilized to distinguish the hold-
ing in Fry from that in National League: the importance of the national
interests involved, the financial impact on the states, and the length of
time of the intrusion."' These factors are relevant to a balancing test,
but not to an absolute immunity." If legislation in the field of state
75. 96 S.Ct. at 2484-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. State and local government employees have been excluded from the coverage of
a significant amount of federal labor and social legislation. See, e.g., National Labor
Relations Act §2(2), 29 U.S.C. §52(2) (1970); Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42
U.S.C. §2000(e) (1964); Social Security Act, 26 U.S.C. §3121(b)(7) (1970), 42 U.S.C.
§410(a)(7)(1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §203(d) (1940). In recent years,
however, the original exemption for governmental employees has been removed in some
instances. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (Supp. V,
1975); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §203(d) (1970). See also H.R. 10210, a bill
currently pending in the 94th Congress, proposing extension of unemployment compensa-
tion to governmental workers. On the basis of National League, such extensions could be
found to impermissibly intrude on integral governmental functions. But see notes 89-91
and accompanying text infra.
77. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
78. 96 S.Ct. at 2474-75. Even if the above criteria are valid, it is questionable whether
they were applied properly. Equally persuasive arguments may be made that Fry sanc-
tioned a greater intrusion into state affairs than was at issue in National League. The 1974
FLSA amendments extended coverage to only 30% of all state and local government
personnel (or 55% when combined with those covered by the 1966 amendments upheld in
Maryland v. Wirtz). They specifically excluded employees in policy-making positions such
as elected officials, executives, and administrators, and provided for the particular needs
of police and fire departments. The Economic Stabilization Act at issue in Fry, in con-
trast, affected virtually all employees, with no special recognition for the unique nature
of local governmental employment. Both the Labor Standards and the Stabilization Acts
imposed mandatory wage controls displacing state interests and decisions that were in
conflict, justified by the commerce power. See Suppl. Brief for Appellee on Reargument
at 13-14, National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465 (1976). See also 96 S.Ct. at
2484 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. The concurring and dissenting opinions suspected that state and federal interests
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governmental "employer-employee relationships" is indeed beyond the
scope of Congressional authority, as the National League decision
averred, ° then logically the maximum wage controls challenged in Fry
and the minimum wage standards at issue in National League should
be equally impermissible. The asserted social importance, low cost, or
short duration of a congressional enactment cannot supply a power that
the Constitution denies."
An alternative to the interpretation that the Court is employing an
unarticulated balancing test is the possibility that it is extending the
were being weighed, but (with good reason) expressed uncertainty. 96 S.Ct. at 2476
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I do not read the opinion so despairingly as does my Brother
Brennan. . . . [lit seems to me it adopts a balancing approach .. "); id. at 2487
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Are state and federal interests being silently balanced?").
Both sides of the litigation also proposed balancing tests, although the relative weights to
be accorded the competing federal and state interests were, of course, different. See Brief
for Appellee at 33 et seq. (commerce power may not be used to destroy sovereignty, but
FLSA has no serious effect on federalism; judicial task is to assess balances and degrees);
Reply Brief for Appellant at 22 et seq. (Balancing of trivial nexus to commerce and
damaging impact to federalism requires that 1974 amendments be invalidated).
80. 96 S.Ct. at 2474.
81. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917) (emergency affords an occasion for the
exercise of existing authority, but does not create new authority). This decision is cited
by the National League majority, incongruously, in support of the statement that the
"national emergency" of economic inflation justified the wage freeze at issue in Fry. 96
S.Ct. at 2475. This use of precedent lends further support to the conclusion that the
majority intended to create a balancing test rather than a total exclusion of Congress from
certain areas of state governmental operations.
In Blackmun's concurring opinion, a balancing approach is suggested by the statement
that the federal interest is "demonstrably greater" in environmental concerns than in the
economic and labor concerns at issue in National League. 96 S.Ct. at 2476. He made no
attempt to substantiate this assertion, nor to explain why one area of regulation is prohib-
ited while another area, also within the commerce power, is permissible. It is possible that
Blackmun's opinion was prompted by a case on federal environmental legislation cur-
rently on the Supreme Court docket. Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d
827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 2224 (1976). The Supreme Court consolidated
15 cases into Brown, which has been scheduled for oral argument. The actions were based
on regulations under the Clean Air Act §101 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §1857 et
seq. The three circuit courts which had considered the actions independently ruled that
the regulations were constitutionally prohibited to the extent that they required states to
administer programs promulgated by the E.P.A. The grounds utilized were consistent
with the majority opinion in National League. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Brown stated that if the federal government could commandeer the adminis-
trative machinery of states, a "Commerce Power so expanded would reduce the states to
puppets of a ventriloquist Congress." Id. at 839. See Note, Constitutional Law-Interstate
Commerce-Federal Regulations Requiring States to Enact Statutes Enforcing Federal
Air Pollution Control Programs Exceed the Commerce Power By Intruding upon State
Sovereignty Protected by the Tenth Amendment, 29 VAND. L. REv. 276 (1976).
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"essential functions" test developed in the taxation cases.82 This possi-
bility is suggested by the references in National League to "traditional"
and "integral" governmental functions.83 In addition, the opinion leaves
unimpaired the decision in United States v. California"' that a state-
operated railroad enjoys no immunity from federal regulation.85 Finally,
there is the fact that Rehnquist suggested the use of the "essential
functions" test in his Fry dissent, conceding that it would involve
"many grey areas, to be marked out on a case-by-case basis."'"
Initial reaction to the National League decision suggests that the
limitation on federal commerce power will be narrowly construed. In
Usery v. Board of Education,"7 a United States district court opinion
rendered only two months after the Supreme Court's decision in
National League, the imposition on state governments of the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act"' was held to be within the scope of
congressional authority. Interpreting National League to establish a bal-
ancing approach even where "integral state functions" were involved,
the district judge found that the national interest in preventing arbi-
trary age discrimination outweighed the state's interest in discrimina-
tory employment practices."' This decision supported the assessment of
the Department of Labor's legal spokesperson that National League
would not affect the validity of the Age Discrimination or Equal Pay
Acts."" The possibility of extending federal collective bargaining rights
82. See cases cited notes 50-54 supra.
83. 96 S.Ct. at 2473, 2474, 2476.
84. 297 U.S. 175 (1936). United States v. California, id. at 184-85, however, specifically
rejected the proprietary distinction in regulatory cases. Cf. New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 580 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., for the Court) (distinction between
normally private and usual governmental functions is "too shifting" and "too entangled
in expediency" to serve as a dependable legal criterion).
85. 96 S.Ct. at 2475 n.18.
86. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
87. Usery v. Board of Educ., Docket No. C 75-510 (D. Utah, Aug. 31, 1976).
88. 29 U.S.C. §§623, 630(b) (1970).
89. The district court stated three independent bases for decision:
1. The balancing approach, derived from National League's discussion of Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
2. The assertion that the Age Discrimination Act imposed only a "negative
obligation" to refrain from discrimination, and therefore did not "directly dis-
place the State's freedom to structure integral operations" (emphasis added by
district judge to National League quotation).
3. The existence of adequate federal authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to protect civil liberties.
90. The Solicitor of Labor's "preliminary assessment" of National League, 1976 BNA
Daily Labor Report No. 127, A-6, A-7 (June 30, 1976), quoted in Aaron, Labor Lail
Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1975-76 Term, 92 LAB. REL. REP. 311 (1976).
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to state and local governmental employees, however, appears to have
received a serious setback as a result of National League.'
RECOMMENDED APPROACH
An absolute rule in favor of either national or state interests does not
afford an adequate or realistic analysis of the interrelated needs of the
two levels of government in the federal system. In future decisions in-
volving federal intrusions into state affairs based on the interstate com-
merce power, it would be logical for the Supreme Court to adopt an
approach explicitly balancing the competing governmental interests.
The federal interest in uniform, enforceable, and effective regulation of
matters affecting interstate commerce should be weighed against the
state interest in preserving a sphere of sovereign and autonomous opera-
tion within the federalistic context.9 2
91. The Solicitor of Labor and the speaker at the ABA Labor Law section convention
agree on this point. Aaron, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1975-76 Term, 92
LAB. REL. REP. 311, 345 n.30 (1976).
92. The specific factors to be considered would have to be developed in the context of
factual disputes presented for adjudication. The factors could include the following:
1. Necessity of state compliance to assure achievement of congressional
objectives; see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (effectiveness of federal
action to stabilize economy would be drastically impaired if state employees
were exempt); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946) (exemption of states from
federal price controls would deprive Congress of ability to effectively combat
inflation); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936) (federal goal of
safeguarding commerce from obstructions due to defective railroad appliances
requires compliance by both privately-owned and state-owned railroads);
2. Availability of alternative means to accomplish the same goals with
substantially less imposition on the states; cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960) (despite legitimacy of governmental purpose, legislation that broadly
intrudes on constitutional rights is invalid if less drastic alternative means are
available); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588-89, 593 (1936)
(Congress established nationwide cooperative federal-state system of unemploy-
ment compensation through tax rebates and without coercion of states or im-
pairment of state sovereignty);
3. Magnitude of the fiscal impact on state governments, necessitating the
imposition of new state taxes or the curtailment of state governmental pro-
grams; Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 203 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(federal law unconstitutionally overwhelms state fiscal policy); New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 et seq. (1946) (Stone, J., concurring) (federal
tax which unduly burdens state government is impermissible); id. at 594 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) (federal taxes are impermissible when they effect states'
ability to operate social programs); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514,
523 (1926) ("neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any sub-
stantial manner the exercise of its powers");
4. Degree of interference with state policy decisions; see M'Culloch v. Mary-
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The balancing approach is subject to the criticism that it might per-
mit judges to substitute their own subjective evaluation of the factors
underlying challenged legislation for the social policy choices appropri-
ately made by Congress. 3 This criticism, however, is misdirected. The
subjectivity to be avoided would be manifested in a confusing and con-
tradictory body of case law. An explicit balancing test would provide
clearer guidelines for reconciling or distinguishing cases such as
National League, on the one hand, and Fry v. United States on the
other. The balancing approach would be a development rather than a
departure from precedent on the Commerce Clause in relation to state
sovereignty. At the same time, explicit balancing would tend to reduce
the likelihood of such disputes, because Congress would have notice of
the factors to be considered in adjudicating challenges to legislation94
and could formulate legislation accordingly.
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819) (there is "a repugnancy between a right
in one government to pull down what there is in another to build up"); Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 202-03 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (law unac-
ceptably forces state to curtail services, refrain from entering new fields of
activity, or raise taxes);
5. Discrimination against state governments, involving the imposition of con-
straints not also applicable to the private sector; cf. New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 582 (1945) (federal tax on activities or property with no counter-
part in private sector, such as maintaining a statehouse, is impermissible);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 194 (1968) (challenged law merely requires
state to adhere to same restrictions applicable to private employer).
For other views of balancing, see the district court opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz, 269
F. Supp. 826, 850 (D. Md. 1967) (Thomsen, C.J., concurring); Comment, An Affirmative
Constitutional Right: The Tenth Amendment and the Resolution of Federalism Conflicts,
13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 876 (1976); Note, Is Federalism Dead? A Constitutional Analysis of
the Federal No-Fault Automobile Insurance Bill: S. 345, 12 HARv. J. LEC.s. 668, 686-91
(1975). But see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1940); United States v. Califor-
nia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
93. See dissenting opinions in National League at 2486 (Brennan) ("balancing ap-
proach . . . is a thinly veiled rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment
that our system reserves to Congress"); 2488 (Stevens) (personal disagreement with wis-
dom of legislation may not affect judgment of its validity). See also criticism of National
League majority and concurring Justices as "superlegislators," Aaron, Labor La Deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, 1975-76 Term, 92 LAB. REL. REP. 311, 314 (1976). See generally
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black, .1.,
dissenting) (the Court improperly acts as "super-legislature" when it weighs competing
state and national interests to determine validity of a state law affecting interstate com-
merce); Oklahoma ex rel. Philips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527-28 (1940) (it
is not for Court to determine if detriment to state outweighs national interests promoted
by federal legislation).
94. See note 92 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The significance of National League of Cities v. Usery is that it estab-
lishes a new constitutional limitation on the exercise of the federal com-
merce power. The principles underlying the new immunity are consis-
tent with those enunciated as early as 1819 in M'Culloch v. Maryland,"'
that the federal system impliedly necessitates constraints upon both the
state and the federal levels of government in the exercise of their powers.
Prior to National League, these principles were applied asymmetrically.
The federal government enjoyed freedom from the burdens of both taxa-
tion and regulation by the states." The states, however, were granted
only a qualified immunity from federal taxation; they were denied pro-
tection from federal regulation under the commerce power. National
League partially resolves this problem, and thereby should enhance the
effective functioning of the federal system. However, the scope and defi-
nition of the states' new immunity is not clear. Although the boundaries
can only be marked out on a case-by-case basis, a clear statement of the
criteria used by the Court to judge these cases would provide an im-
proved framework for reconciling the competing interests of the sover-
eign components of the federal system.
Robert C. Art
95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Supreme Court in M'Culloch v. Maryland stated
that in the implied necessity for intergovernmental immunity,
We have a principle which is safe for the states, and safe for the Union. We are
relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from interfering powers;
from a repugnancy between a right in one government to pull down, what there
is an acknowledged right in another to build up; from the incompatibility of a
right in one government to destroy, what there is a right in another to preserve.
Id. at 430.
96. Cases on state immunity from taxation are discussed in notes 50-54 supra. The
federal freedom from taxation by any state or political subdivision (unless the national
government consents to be taxed) is established in, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 368 U.S. 146 (1961); S.R.A. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946); Cleve-
land v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151
(1886); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Similarly, the federal
government is immune from state regulation which would impede or burden the exercise
of federal functions. United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285 (1963);
Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1945); Arizona v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920); United States v. City
of Chester, 144 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1944).
